MUNI
ECON

Young Economists' Meeting

MAY 26–27, 2022, BRNO

Welcome to Brno

"Among Czechs, Moravia's capital has a dull rep: a likeable enough place where not much actually happens. That 'nothing to do here' feel was cemented in the early 2000s by the hit local film Boredom in Brno (Nuda v Brně), and, sadly, not many people have gone back to reappraise their opinions. The reality, however, is very different. Tens of thousands of students who attend university here ensure a lively cafe and club scene that easily rivals Prague's. The museums are great too. And if you add in some excellent microbreweries and at least two of the country's best restaurants, there's plenty to reward more than a transit stop." Lonely Planet

Špilberg castle

You won't regret spending an extra day or two in Brno. The city offers many great things to see and do, yet is not spoiled by tourism and commerce. In 2016 Brno was listed among the top 10 of the best alternative city breaks in Europe by The Guardian and in the list of 52 Places to Go by The New York Times. Brno is internationally recognized for its modernist architecture – the Stiassni villa, a magnificent functionalist villa with a three-hectare garden, is located just 500m from the Faculty.

To get to know the city and learn what to do, visit www.gotobrno.cz.

Keynote Lectures

The only child

Erik Plug

Erik Plug is a Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam, and his main research interests relate to family, education and labour economics. He has been the president of EALE (2017-2020) and of ESPE (2015). He is serving as Associate Editor at the Economic Journal, and is a research fellow at Tinbergen Institute, Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS), IZA, and CESifo. He published his research in American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Human Resources, and Journal of Public Economics.

www: https://plug.economists.nl/

The Economics of Identity and Conflict [ONLINE]

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Subhasish M. Chowdhury is the Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Bath, specializing in Contest Theory, Experimental / Behavioral Economics, and Industrial Organization. His current research covers both theoretical and applied investigations of problems in contests and conflict. He is a Co-Editor of Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, and is in the editorial board in Studies in Microeconomics. His research has been published in journals such as the Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economics, Economic Theory among others.

www: https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Conference Schedule

Thursday May 26

Venue: Kabaret Špaček, Kopečná 46, Brno

16:30 – 17:00	Registration	
17:00 – 18:15	Keynote lecture by Erik Plug	
	The only child	
18:15 – 22:30	Dinner	

Friday May 27

Venue: Faculty of Economics and Administration, Lipová 41a, Brno

from 8:00	*Registration*	
8:30 – 9:30	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 1.a	P304
	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 1.b	P302b
	Labor Economics 1	P303
9:30 – 10:00	*Coffee break*	
10:00 – 11:00	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2.a	P304
	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2.b	P302b
	Labor Economics 2	P303
11:00 – 11:20	*Coffee break*	
11:20 – 12:20	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 3.a	P304
	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 3.b	P302b
	Labor Economics 3	P303
12:20 – 13:15	*Lunch*	
13:15 – 14:30	Keynote lecture by Subhasish M. Chowdhury	P304
	The Economics of Identity and Conflict	
14:30 – 15:30	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 4.a	P304
	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 4.b	P302b
	Labor Economics 4	P303
15:30 – 16:00	*Coffee break*	
16:00 – 17:20	Behavioral and Experimental Economics 5	P304
16:00 – 17:00	Labor Economics 5	P303

Venue: Restaurant Mitrovski, Veletržní 716/13, Brno

19:00 – 21:00	Goodbye dinner

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 1.a

8:30-9:30 P304

Gergely Hajdu	Image Concerns and Voting Order in Group Decisions
Junze Sun	Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Censorship
Pavel Ilinov	When Misalignment Is Useful: Delegation to Arationally Inattentive Agent

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 1.b

8:30-9:30 P302b

Máté Csaba Sándor	Approaching the Hot Hand With a Cool Head
Vojtěch Kotrba	Testing "Hot Hand" Hypothesis At the Individual Athletes' Level in Soccer
Marc Kaufmann	Narrow Bracketing in Work Choices

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2.a

10:00-11:00 P304

Yang Zhong	Time Pressure Preferences
Zain Chaudhry	Fickle Groups: An Empirical Assessment of Time Preferences
Pavel Kocourek	Demand in the Dark

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2.b

10:00-11:00 P302b

Bilal Kchouri	Lying for Money: An Experiment on Religion Followers
Christoph Huber	On Social Norms and Observability in (Dis)Honest Behavior
Juan F. Blazquiz-Pulido	Analyzing Deception, Honesty, and Trustworthiness in Sender-Receiver Games

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 3.a

11:20-12:20 P304

Luca Flóra Drucker	Difficult Merits
Taha Movahedi	Moral Wiggle Room and Social Identity
Katarína Čellárová	Self-Selection and the Willingness to Share

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 3.b

11:20-12:20 P302b

Alexandra Baier	Just Saying Sorry- The Effect of Apologies on Reintegration After Social Exclusion
Jonathan Stäbler	Spite in Litigation
Vanessa Schöller	Gender Versus Sex: What Drives Behavior?

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 4.a

14:30-15:30 P304

Lenka Fiala	Design in One-Sided Matching Problems
Firoz Ahmed	Improving Women's Mental Health During a Pandemic
Thomas Rittmansberger	Social Norms and Willingness to Vaccinate

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 4.b

14:30-15:30 P302b

Johannes Walter	In Algorithms We Trust - Once We Learned to Understand Them?
Tabaré Capitán	Meta-Nudge: A Nudge on a Nudge
Berenika Tužilová	Enhancing Tax Compliance By Increasing Information Salience: Natural Field Experiment

Behavioral and Experimental Economics 5

16:00-17:20 P304

Christos Litsios	Role Preferences and Social Image Concerns in the Dictator Game
Theodor Kouro	Towards an Understanding of Allocation Choice in Charitable Giving: A Natural Field Experiment of Donations to Children With Down Syndrome in Albania
Diya Abraham	Opting in to Dictator Games: The Effect of Voluntary Vulnerability on Dictator Giving
Miloš Fišar	Mind the Framing, When Studying Social Preferences in the Domain of Losses!

Labor Economics 1

8:30-9:30 Room P303

Diego Zambiasi	Dangerous Journeys. The Consequences of Externalizing Rescue Operations At Sea *Discussant: Jakub Lonsky*
Jakub Lonsky	Dreaming Of Leaving the Nest? Immigration Status and the Living Arrangements of Dacamented *Discussant: Luca Fumarco*
Martin Guzi	The Impact of Immigration and Integration Policies on Immigrant-Native Labor Market Hierarchies *Discussant: Diego Zambiasi*

Labor Economics 2

10:00-11:00 Room P303

Huaiping Yuan	Pitfalls of Pay Transparency: Evidence From the Lab and the Field *Discussant: Lena Adamus*
Patrick Nüß	Management Opposition, Strikes and Union Threat *Discussant: Huaiping Yuan*
Lena Adamus	Appetites Grow With Age: Wage Expectations Among Slovak Men and Women *Discussant: Patrick Nüß*

Labor Economics 3

11:20-12:20 Room P303

Michaela Kecskésová	Malaria and Economic Development in the Short-Term: Plasmodium Falciparum Vs Plasmodium Vivax *Discussant: Andrej Cupák*
Vojtěch Mišák	Crime and Weather. Evidence From the Czech Republic. *Discussant: Michaela Kecskésová*
Andrej Cupák	Housing Wealth, Neighbourhoods and Life Satisfaction: A Metadata Instrumental-Variable Approach *Discussant: Vojtěch Mišák*

Labor Economics 4

14:30-15:30 Room P303

Katharina Adler	Gender Differences in Earnings Expectations and Their Role for Major Choice *Discussant: Adrian Mehic*
Kerstin Grosch	Closing the Gender Stem Gap - A Large-Scale Randomized-Controlled Trial in Elementary Schools *Discussant: Katharina Adler*
Adrian Mehic	Peer Desirability and Academic Achievement *Discussant: Kerstin Grosch*

Labor Economics 5

16:00-17:00 Room P303

Annalisa Tassi	Local Engagement: Do Community Needs Affect the Decision to Volunteer? *Discussant: Dennis Gottschlich*
Anna Herget	Once a Temporary Agency Worker - Negative Effects Forever? *Discussant: Annalisa Tassi*
Dennis Gottschlich	The Unintentional Costs of Austerity *Discussant: Anna Herget*

General Information

Guidance for Presenters and Session Chairs

The conference features five sessions in three of two panels. We suggest speakers prepare a 20-minute presentation and upload their slides in ppt or pdf on the computer before the session begins. Each room is equipped with a computer, a projector and a whiteboard. Papers will be presented in the order listed in the program. The last presenter will chair the session and keep time.

Best Paper Award

The winning paper will be announced before the keynote lecture on Friday.

Coffee Breaks and Lunch

The coffee breaks and lunch will be on the 3rd floor. A ring of the bell will announce the start of each session.

WiFi

Wireless Internet is available through *eduroam* network. If you require access information, please contact the registration desk.

Getting around

Brno provides a great public transport system that runs 24/7 - buses, trams, and trolleybuses during the day, night buses after 11 pm. The conference venue (Faculty) is 10 minutes by tram no. 1 (direction: Pisárky) from the main train station to the stop Lipová. The fare is 20 Kč (about 0.8 Eur) for a 15-minute ticket, or 25 Kč (about 1 Eur) for a 60-minute ticket. The tickets can be bought from the yellow ticket vending machines at the bus/ tram stop, or at the newspaper stalls. You can also buy a ticket with valid contactless bank card (a debit card, or a credit card). All you have to do is attach the card to the validator after boarding. SMS tickets can be purchased as well but only with a Czech phone number.

Behavioral and Experimental Economics Panel

Image Concerns and Voting Order in Group Decisions

8:30
P304

Gergely Hajdu, Gábor Nyéki

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Jury decisions and hiring decisions by company boards are just some examples of sequential public voting where members might care to look similar in their preferences to other members. We argue that such social-image concerns can result in inefficiencies where even the majority voting rule doesn't necessarily select the majority preferred option. We model binary decisions in three-member groups with public and sequential votes aggregated using the majority rule. Each member is randomly drawn from the population and has a private binary type which is her individually preferred decision. One of the members may have image concerns that compel her to vote differently than her type. We show that when the proportion of types in the population is close to equal, then this member is more likely to vote against her own type if she votes second than if she votes first. This ranking, however, can flip if the population share of the majority type is close to 1. That is, simultaneous voting can be worse than sequential voting.

How does choice affect learning?

8:30
P304

Junze Sun, Arthur Schram, Randolph Sloof

European University Institute

We study public persuasion in elections, in which a monopoly designer or multiple competing designers attempt to influence the election outcome by manipulating public information about a payoff relevant state. We allow for a wide class of designer preferences, ranging from pursuing pure self-interest to maximizing any social welfare function expressed as weighted sum of voter payoffs (e.g., utilitarian). Our main result identifies a novel single-crossing property and shows that it guarantees the optimality of censorship policies – which reveal intermediate states while censor extreme states – in large elections under both monopolistic and competitive persuasion. The singlecrossing property is (i) generically satisfied when designers are self-interested, or (ii) satisfied for generic designer preferences under a mild assumption on the distribution of voters' preferences. We also analyze how the structure of the equilibrium censorship policy varies with the designer's preference and voting rules. Finally, we apply our results to study the welfare impacts of media bias and competition and show that, contrary to common wisdom, increased media competition may in fact harm voter welfare by inducing excessive information disclosure.

8:30
P304

When Misalignment is Useful: Delegation to Arationally Inattentive Agent

Pavel Ilinov, Andrei Matveenko, Maxim Senkov, Egor Starkov

CERGE-EI

A principal needs to delegate a decision under uncertainty to an agent and chooses among candidates who differ in their prior beliefs. Prior to making the decision, the agents can flexibly acquire costly information. We show that the principal can generally benefit from delegation when the agent's belief differs from the belief of the principal. We also show that the same choice probabilities can be implemented in the best alternative choice problem by the usage of the system of bonuses. However, this equivalence result does not necessarily hold in the general problem formulation.

8:30
P302b

Approaching the Hot Hand With a Cool Head

Barna Bakó, **Máté Csaba Sándor**

Corvinus University of Budapest

In their influential paper Xu and Harvey (2014) claim that gamblers are more likely to win in subsequent games if they are in a winning streak and more likely to lose if they experience a losing streak. They suggest that gamblers create their own hot hand by falling for the gambler's fallacy. In this article we present both theoretical and empirical results that challenge these findings. First, we prove theoretically that the presented results can occur without the existence of the hot hand. Second, by replicating their analysis on a large online dataset consisting of 916,640 observations for 10,963 gamblers, we show that similar findings can be observed on the aggregate level as in their analysis, yet individual-level data show no support for the claimed findings, in particular for the existence of the hot hand.

8:30
P302b

Testing "Hot Hand" Hypothesis at the Individual Athletes' Level in Soccer

Vojtěch Kotrba

Prague University of Economics and Business

The existence of a hot hand in individual athletes' performance in soccer under fantasy sports rules is investigated in this paper. It is also investigated whether fantasy sports users use this heuristic in selecting their squads. Using unique data of the performance of athletes and users' demand for them, the results show some existence of a hot hand, however, it fails to explain most future performance. Fantasy users overuse this heuristic.

Narrow Bracketing in Work Choices

8:30
P302b

Francesco Fallucchi, **Marc Kaufmann**

Central European University

Many important economic outcomes result from cumulative effects of smaller choices, so the best outcomes require accounting for other choices at each decision point. We document narrow bracketing — the neglect of such accounting—in work choices in a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk: bracketing due to separate or combined choice presentations changes average reservation wages by 13-28%. In our experiment, broad bracketing is so simple to implement that narrow bracketing is hard to reconcile with optimal conservation of cognitive resources. An attempt at debiasing by drawing attention to the interdependencies has limited success. require accounting for other choices at each decision point. We document narrow bracketing — the neglect of such accounting—in work choices in a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk: bracketing due to separate or combined choice presentations changes average reservation wages by 13-28%. In our experiment, broad bracketing is so simple to implement that narrow bracketing is hard to reconcile with optimal conservation of cognitive resources. An attempt at debiasing by drawing attention to the interdependencies has limited success.

Time Pressure Preferences

10:00
P304

Thomas Buser, Roel van Veldhuizen, **Yang Zhong**

University of Amsterdam

Many professional and educational settings require individuals to be willing and able to perform under time pressure. We use a lab experiment to elicit preferences for working under time pressure in an incentivized way. We elicit the minimum additional payment participants require to complete a cognitive task under various levels of time pressure versus completing it without pressure. We make three main contributions. First, we document that participants are averse to working under time pressure on aggregate. Second, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of time pressure aversion across individuals and that these individual preferences can be captured by simple survey questions. Third, we include these questions in a survey of bachelor students and show that time pressure preferences correlate with future career expectations. Our results indicate that individuals' differences in time pressure aversion could be an influential factor for labor market outcomes.

10:00
P304

Fickle Groups: An Empirical Assessment of Time Preferences

Zain Chaudhry, Karrar Hussain

University of Heidelberg

Groups with potentially heterogeneous time preferences make many intertemporal decisions jointly. This paper studies the empirical relationship between individual time preferences and group intertemporal decisions. Individual and collective intertemporal preferences are measured based on the allocation of costly tasks over time. We find that collective decisions result in much higher present-bias (procrastination) than do individual decisions. This finding is robust to a variety of alternative specifications. Connecting the groups' behavior with their individual members' behavior, we find that within groups the individuals with more procrastination tendency have a significant impact on the group decision. Group decisions also exhibit a higher degree of present-bias when the difference in measured discount rates between group members is larger. We also find that present-bias in the group decisions is reduced when bargaining powerin the group is less symmetric.

10:00
P304

Demand in the Dark

Pavel Kocourek, Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart

CERGE-EI

A growing body of evidence suggests that consumers are not fully informed about prices, contrary to a critical assumption of classical consumer theory. We analyze a model in which consumer types can vary in both their preferences and their information about prices. Given data on demand and the distribution of prices, we identify the set of possible values of the consumer surplus. Each surplus in this set can be rationalized with simple information structures and preferences. We also show how to narrow down the set of values using richer datasets and provide bounds on counterfactual demands at perfectly observed prices.

10:00
P302b

Lying for Money: An Experiment on Religion Followers

Bilal Kchouri

University of Luxembourg

I study the influence of religion on people's cheating behavior when there is a monetary incentive. Results of dice-under-the-cup experiment on 581 participants in Lebanon show that non-believers cheat significantly more than believers. In the first experiment, participants express their beliefs ex-post, 16.7% of non-believers and 5% of believers turn to be cheating. In the second experiment, I remind participants with their beliefs before they make financial decision. Difference in the unethical behavior between believers and non-believers is stronger and significant as 12.6% of non-believers are ready to cheat to get

the maximum payoff and 8% lies for the second best; while 1.3% of believers are dishonest.

On Social Norms and Observability in (Dis)Honest Behavior

10:00
P302b

Christoph Huber, Christos Litsios, Annika Nieper, Timo Promann

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Transparency has been shown to foster ethical decision-making as people tend to comply with the underlying norm. This mechanism relies on a social norm for honesty. In a die-rolling experiment, we aim to challenge the proposition that transparency and observability necessarily increase honesty and investigate whether observability can have detrimental effects in situations with a social norm for dishonesty. We thus manipulate not only the observability of people's decisions, but also the underlying social norm—that is, we introduce a norm nudge towards honesty or dishonesty, and make participants' decisions observable and open to other participants' judgment. Our nudge towards honesty indeed increases participants' level of honesty. Introducing social image concerns by varying observability, however, does not interact with this effect.

Analyzing Deception, Honesty, and Trustworthiness in Sender-Receiver Games

10:00
P302b

Juan Francisco Blazquiz-Pulido, Luca Polonio, Ennio Bilancini

IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca

Informational asymmetries are present in many real-life situations where lying can be used to benefit from the uninformed party, such as financial advising or politics. However, telling the truth can also be a manipulative method to mislead the counterpart to the sender's benefit. This paper studies subjects' intentions in cheap-talk games where players can tell the truth with deceiving intentions. In an online experiment, we combine a sender-receiver game with possible strategic considerations and its subsequent belief elicitation task with a novel sender-receiver game where no room for strategic considerations is allowed. Joining the behavior in both games and the elicited beliefs, we create a new classification of the sender's behavior in this setting, disentangling intentions not identified before. Our results reveal that the single use of beliefs to identify behaviors in sender-receiver games with a strategic component could be not enough, leading to a misinterpretation of the behavior of some players and then misidentifying the overall amount of deception in the game. Lastly, we provide information about receivers analyzing the effect of their role on trust and honesty.

11:20
P304

Difficult Merits

Luca Flóra Drucker

Central European University

The meritocratic fairness view accepts income inequality that is based on differences in individual achievement. However, a particular achievement is not equally difficult for everyone. I study how information about differences in difficulties affects redistributive decisions. I consider two sources of difficulties: external circumstances and individual ability. Participants have to redistribute the income earned by achievement within pairs with information about the relative difficulty of the task within the pair. I find that participants strongly compensate the member of the pair who had a harder job in producing if the difficulties come from an external source, but fully ignore the relative difficulties when they arise from individual ability. This is true for both when participants redistribute between themselves and another subject and when they redistribute between two other subjects. Nevertheless, when involved, those with externally harder tasks care more about relative difficulties than those with easier tasks, suggesting that the latter still believe they deserve more for their higher production, even though they learned that their partner had a harder job.

11:20
P304

Moral Wiggle Room and Social Identity

Taha Movahedi, Zahra Murad

University of Portsmouth

Altruistic behaviour has been shown to be sensitive to contextual settings such as a possibility of a moral wiggle room. When moral wiggle room for selfishness is available individuals more frequently choose selfish outcomes. We also observe that in many settings individuals discriminate between an out-group and an in-group member of the social group that they belong to. How does the possibility of moral wiggle room interact with group preferences to affect altruistic behaviour? We hypothesize that selfish behaviour will increase when moral wiggle room is possible and there will be more discriminatory exploitation of moral wiggle rooms against out-groups than in-groups. We find that in settings where the use of moral wiggle room is not possible, very few people choose the selfish option and there is no discrimination between an in-group and out-group. However, in settings where moral wiggle room is possible, participants choose the selfish option more frequently and clearly show discriminatory behaviour against an out-group member. We conclude that moral wiggle room is used as an excuse to discriminate in situations where blatant discrimination cannot be morally justified.

Self-Selection and the Willingness to Share

11:20
P304

Katarína Čellárová

Masaryk University

Political leaders are often chosen through competition. The candidate must put money and effort to the election campaign, while the return of this investment is uncertain. Therefore, people with specific value sets, can be over-proportionally elected as leaders. We study whether people self-select to the position with power in the laboratory experiment. Two players can compete for a right to distribute resources between themselves, and a third, uninvolved player. Even though both players suggest the final allocation, we implement only the winner's decision. We measure self-selection by difference of transfers between winners and losers in two treatments. We ask both winners and leaders to know what would happen if other type won. In addition, we account for the effect of wealth in a control treatment without the investment stage . We find substantial self-selection to the position of power – people who invested more in the contest treatment transferred significantly less than those who invested less, and this result is not driven by wealth. Both winning the contest and engaging in it have a significant negative effect on sharing.

Just Saying Sorry- The Effect of Apologies on Reintegration After Social Exclusion

11:20
P302b

Alexandra Baier, Tarek Jaber-Lopez

University of Innsbruck

Apologies are ubiquitous in life and although being free of consequences, are able to impact social relationships as well as material outcomes. Besides its usage in fields like psychology and business ethics, one specific application refers to restorative justice programs for offenders after release from prison. Recent empirical work shows the effectiveness of apologies in criminal justice approaches as an alternative to harsher punishment and its effects on re-offending. Given the high economic costs related to the criminal justice system, investigating cheap interventions that can support successful reintegration is of high social interest. While real world data is biased by unobservable influences, a controlled experiment can provide additional evidence on the effect of apologies after exclusion. In that spirit, we present data from an online experiment in which subjects can steal from group members and can be excluded by majority voting. We vary the option to apologize and reputational concerns in four treatments. In the main treatment, excluded subjects have the possibility to apologize at small costs before reintegrating to their former group. Apologizing in this setting presents a tool to potentially enhance the integration of excluded subjects by their group. Compared to a baseline setting without apologies, we find that being able to apologize reduces stealing activities significantly. In 30% of cases, excluded subjects sent an apology and those subjects that apologized experienced more re-integrative behavior from the group than those excluded subjects that did not apologize. Additionally, we examine truthfulness of apologies in a setting without reputational concerns and find that in our setting apologies are not purely used as a strategic device but can be found without any strategic consequences. Our results can complement empirical and psychological research on the effectiveness of apologies in restorative justice programs.

11:20
P302b

Spite in Litigation

Wladislaw Mill, **Jonathan Stäbler**

University of Mannheim

The goal of this paper is to study how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by subjects motivated by spiteful preferences – a potentially common driver for litigation behavior. We focus on litigation and settlement behavior both under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. To evaluate our theoretical predictions, we conduct an online experiment. We find that participants exhibit higher litigation expenditures under the English fee-shifting rule and that there is no difference for settlement requests. More importantly, we find that litigation expenditures and settlement requests are higher for more spiteful participants. The relative increase in litigation expenditures due to spite is more pronounced under the American fee-shifting rule. We further find that the expected payoff for more spiteful societies is much lower than for less spiteful societies. This effect is particularly pronounced for low-merit cases under the English rule compared to a constant cost under the American rule.

11:20
P302b

Gender Versus Sex: What Drives Behavior?

Helena Fornwagner, Brit Grosskopf, Alexander Lauf, **Vanessa Schöller**, Silvio Städter

University of Regensburg

Almost everyone makes decisions involving money on a daily basis. Because of the importance of such economic decision–making, researchers have looked into what factors influence behavior. Gender has come out to be a key factor explaining differences in behavior. But how much can be associated with gender, and how much is based on the biological sex people are endowed with? In this paper, we take a systematic approach to test for gender and sex differences in behavior. We run an experiment where we first look into correlations of gender and sex with competitiveness, risk–taking, and altruism by comparing decisions of cisgender (cismen and ciswomen) and transgender (transmen and transwomen) individuals. Second, we prime our participants with either a masculine or a feminine gender identity. By subconsciously activating a gender, we can establish a causality between gender and behavior in our sample of cis- and transgender participants. We hypothesize that if gender (and not sex) is indeed a primary factor for decision–making, (i) individuals of the same gender (and different sex, i.e., ciswomen/transwomen and cismen/transmen) make similar decisions, and decisions significantly differ when gender differs (and sex is the same, i.e., cismen/ transwomen and ciswomen/transmen), and (ii) priming changes behavior. Based on 780 observations collected online, we conclude that the role of gender (and sex) is not as decisive for economic behavior as we assumed. This paper contributes to the literature by having a transgender sample, two different approaches measuring gender effects, and considering gender on a continuous scale.

Information Design in One-Sided Matching Problems

14:30
P304

Sulagna Dasgupta, **Lenka Fiala**, Jantsje Mol

Nova School of Business and Economics

In one-sided matching settings such as public housing allocation and organ transplant matching, objects are allocated to agents based on agent preferences. However, agents may not always know, a priori, their preferences over the objects, because they do not have enough information about the objects' characteristics. In this context, we investigate how a benevolent social planner should optimally reveal information to the agents to maximize aggregate welfare. We conduct an online experiment to test the theoretical predictions of Dasgupta (2020), and identify the behavioral explanations for why the model mismatches behavior. We contrast our results to simulations to highlight under which distribution of player types a partial reveal of information results in higher social welfare than full information.

Improving Women's Mental Health During a Pandemic

14:30
P304

Michael Vlassopoulos, Abu Siddique, Tabassum Rahman, Debayan Pakrashi, Asad Islam, **Firoz Ahmed**

Technical University of Munich

In low-income settings, women are vulnerable to the psychological distress caused by the social and economic impact of large-scale shocks (e.g., pandemics, natural disasters, political). This paper evaluates a randomized over-the-phone counseling intervention aimed at mitigating the mental health impact of COVID-19 on a sample of 2,402 women across 357 villages in Bangladesh. We find that the provision of mental support to participating women improves their mental health ten months post-intervention, leading to reductions of 20.4% in the prevalence of moderate and severe stress and 32.8% in depression, relative to women in the control group. We also find positive impacts on economic outcomes: household food security and time invested in homeschooling of children, suggesting that improvement in mental health is an important step toward better economic well-being for these women. Finally, we also observe impacts on various other outcomes, including preventive health behavior associated with COVID-19 and vaccination take-up. Our results suggest that this type of low-cost intervention can be effective in providing rapid psychological support to vulnerable groups in times of crises.

14:30
P304

Social Norms and Willingness to Vaccinate

Silvia Angerer, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Philipp Lergetporer, **Thomas Rittmansberger**

University of Innsbruck

Even though, vaccinating is the most promising strategy to end the current pandemic, many countries still face high refusal rates of COVID-19 vaccinations. Consequently, policy makers are looking for (non-coercive) ways to increase vaccination readiness. From an economics perspective, a potentially powerful tool to foster vaccination readiness are social norms, as they govern a wide range of behavior, but are often misperceived by a non-negligible part of society. In this paper, we test if people misperceive the social norm to get vaccinated, and whether correcting these misperceptions influences vaccination readiness. We conducted a two-stage information-provision-experiment in Germany, where we elicited social norms in the first survey (N1 = 2,030) and use the descriptive norm as information in the second survey (N2 = 3,045). We find strong associations between perceived social norms and vaccination readiness. Furthermore, we find that correcting misperceptions about the social norm strongly affects norm-beliefs. However, we do not find evidence that these changes in beliefs translate to changes in vaccination readiness.

14:30
P302b

In Algorithms We Trust - Once We Learned to Understand Them?

Johannes Walter, Jan Biermann, John Horton

ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Increasingly, human decision-makers in socio-economic settings are being advised by (supervised-learning) algorithmic systems. This can be problematic as these advising algorithms sometimes perform well and other times perform poorly and thereby can negatively affect the final decision quality. We focus on a relatively underexplored solution to this problem and ask how decision-makers can more accurately assess the algorithm advice quality to ignore it when they should ignore it and exploit it when they should exploit it. We conduct an online experiment on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (n = 1565) and find in an abstracted setting that feedback on the algorithm performance has a large positive effect on decision quality. Interestingly, explaining how the algorithm works does not improve decisions.

14:30
P302b

Meta-Nudge: A Nudge on a Nudge

Tabaré Capitán, Linda Thunström, Klaas van 't Veld, Jonas Nordström, Jason Shogren

Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Nudges are used (with the intent) to 'directly' affect a choice of interest. Yet nudges often fail to do (as much) as expected. In such cases, meta-nudges can help by directly affecting how people react to another nudge, thus 'indirectly' affecting the choice of interest. For example, in a lab experiment (with 800

students) and an online replication on MTurk (with 600 gig workers), we show that prenudges can make information provision nudges more effective by reducing information avoidance (in the context of calorie information).

Enhancing Tax Compliance by Increasing Information Salience: Natural Field Experiment

14:30
P302b

Dagmara Celik-Katreniak, Lubomír Cingl, Richard Priesol, Petra Rybošová, **Berenika Tužilová**

Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze

The paper presents results from a randomized field experiment administered in cooperation with the Financial Administration of the Slovak Republic (FASR) aiming to increase tax collections of Capital Gains Tax on property (further just "Tax"). The intervention is based on sending informative letters to more than 14 thousand of potential evaders. Sending reminder letters had a significant effect on the tax compliance and increased the number of taxpayers who declared the Tax by 26.6 pp and brought FASR additional 2.5 mil. Eur. To see whether the content of a letter matters, we tested four variations of the letter on top of a baseline letter - two types of deterrence messages, two moral messages, each interacted with an additional leaflet - but none of them significantly increased the tax compliance compared to the baseline letter. Additional informative leaflet with visual guidelines decreased the response rate of those in standard reporting period and had no effect on those taxpayers in expired reporting periods.

Role Preferences and Social Image Concerns in the Dictator Game

16:00
P304

Christos Litsios, Fanny Schories

University of Hamburg

We examine how role preferences interact with social image concerns in a dictator game experiment. The role assignment for the dictator game is endogenous within subject pairs: subjects bid for the dictator role in a second-price auction. The dictator can then freely implement a division of a given amount of money between herself and the recipient. We measure the willingness to pay for the dictator role in two settings: when the payout for the game is kept secret and when it is made public. Our hypotheses follow arguments of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) that the offer made by the dictator is a signal that reveals information about her preference for fairness, a motive which is amplified in the public treatment. We find that role preferences and image concerns are indeed connected: the willingness to pay for the dictator role decreases, and the dictator offer increases when image concerns are stimulated.

Towards an Understanding of Allocation Choice in Charitable Giving: A Natural Field Experiment of Donations to Children With Down Syndrome in Albania

16:00
P304

Theodor Kouro

CERGE-EI

This study examines a new strategy for raising charitable giving: a choice to allocate contributions to a continuous set of needs that benefit the same type of recipient, i.e., helping the same individuals in various ways. It further delves into the mechanisms underlying the effect of the allocation choice. In particular, I ask whether people donate more because they encounter an increased agency or like to engage in allocation decisions. Lastly, this paper explores whether people donate more when they have a chance to make more informed allocation decisions. I collaborated with the Down Syndrome Albania (DSA) foundation to implement a natural field experiment of donations to children with Down Syndrome in Albania. The priority needs include therapeutic treatment, entertainment activities, and humanitarian aid. Up to date, we recruited 16 firms that had supported DSA in the past and asked them to send randomized e-mails to their employees, which contained a survey link installed as a sub-domain of the DSA's website. The survey questions were identical up to the call-for-donation question. The control group was aware of the three needs, but they could not allocate their donation to any of them. The choice group was asked whether they would like to allocate their donation to each of the three needs. The allocation group was forced to allocate their gift, and the link group had a chance to read more information prior to making allocation decisions. We received over 800 survey responses out of 3240 sent emails, and the donation rate is 45%. The results suggest that forcing donors to allocate more than doubled donations. Similarly, those offered allocation as a choice donated 56% more than donors in the control group. Both treatment effects are statistically equal, and interestingly, 76% of donors in the choice group took the allocation option. This set of results hints toward an engagement mechanism rather than an increased agency. Lastly, offering donors a chance to make more informed allocation decisions does not impact donations. The results are robust to controlling for a set of baseline characteristics and firm fixed effects.

Opting in to dictator games: The effect of voluntary vulnerability on dictator giving

16:00
P304

Diya Abraham

Vienna University of Economics and Business Masaryk University

I investigate whether intentionally becoming vulnerable when asking for help affects how the helper responds. I employ a dictator game in which dictators have 3x the initial endowment of the recipients. Potential recipients choose whether they want to engage in the game thus "asking the dictator for help", or stay out of it. In different treatments, I vary whether dictators have the option to take money from the recipients (take vs. give games), and whether recipients themselves make the choice to enter the game or a random lottery outcome determines their participation (opt-in vs. standard games). List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) demonstrated that introducing take options has a negative effect on giving in the standard games and I replicate this result. Introducing take options in the opt-in games, however, implies that

the recipient, is also able to signal her willingness to become vulnerable to the dictator's actions by opting in, and this could potentially have a positive effect on giving. I not only find no effect of this intention to become vulnerable on giving in the opt-in vs. standard take game but also find that conditional on giving a positive amount, introducing a take option has a stronger negative effect on giving in the opt-in games compared with the standard games. The beliefs elicited from dictators indicate that their response to vulnerability runs contrary to theories of both reciprocity and guilt aversion. Overall, my results suggest that in this zero-sum context, signaling vulnerability may be detrimental when asking for help.

Mind the Framing, When Studying Social Preferences in the Domain of Losses!

16:00
P304

Armenak Antinyan, Luca Corazziniy, **Miloš Fišar**, Tommaso Reggiani

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Altruism plays a vital role in the modern welfare state and often facilitates socially desirable allocations in the society that would be otherwise unattainable. One aspect of altruism that has been studied is the impact of monetary losses on altruism; however, the literature provides mixed evidence that the losses make individuals more generous or more selfish or do not change their behavior. We designed two large-scale and fully incentivized online studies using the dictator game in which we manipulate the mechanism behind their initial endowment (windfall vs. real-effort decoding task) and the framing of the loss. We design three treatments, the traditional dictator game as the control; and two-loss manipulation treatments where the dictator may experience loss and share it with the recipient under different framing. Our preliminary results indicate that the mechanisms behind initial endowment generation do not significantly influence the dictators' behavior. We, however, observe that monetary losses do affect the prosocial behavior of the dictators, albeit the framing of the loss is crucial.

Labor Economics Panel

Dangerous Journeys. The Consequences of Externalizing Rescue Operations at Sea

8:30
P303

Emanuele Albarosa, **Diego Zambiasi**

Newcastle University Business School

The number of forcibly displaced individuals worldwide doubled between 2010 and 2019. The huge migration wave that came with it brought several countries to sign so-called migration deals, agreements whereby transit countries stop migrants from reaching the destination country in exchange for financial and logistical support by the destination country or by an international organization. We show that such an agreement between Italy and Libya acted the safety of migration routes as well as the decisions of migrants and human smugglers. This agreement outsourced search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean to the Libyan coast guard with the declared objective to prevent migrants from departing from Libya. Using a spatial difference-in-differences design, we show that externalizing border control and search and rescue operations to the Libyan coast guard made the Central Mediterranean Route deadlier. Furthermore, we provide suggestive evidence that migrants and human smugglers re-acted to this policy by changing their routes and diverting a substantial fraction of the illegal migration ow to the Western Mediterranean Route.

Dreaming Of Leaving the Nest? Immigration Status and the Living Arrangements of DACAmented

8:30
P303

Rania Gihleb, Osea Giuntella, **Jakub Lonsky**

University of Liverpool and IZA

This study investigates the effects of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) on the living arrangements and housing behavior of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Using an event-study approach and difference-in-differences (DID) estimates, we compare immigrants above and below eligibility cutoffs and demonstrate that after the adoption of the policy in June 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live with their parents or in multigenerational households (-11%) and more likely to live independently (+15.5%). We also reveal that DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live in the same house (+2%) and more likely to move out of ethnic enclaves (-3%). Lower rental costs (-4.5%) may have facilitated this transition into adulthood and the observed trends in living arrangements. DACA also led to a decline in marriage rates among DACA-eligible individuals, while we found no evidence of significant effects on cohabitation, divorce, and intermarriage. We also found no evidence of a clear impact on fertility.

The Impact of Immigration and Integration Policies on Immigrant-Native Labor Market Hierarchies

8:30
P303

Martin Guzi

Masaryk University

Across the European Union (EU) labor markets, immigrant and native populations exhibit disparate labor market outcomes, signifying widespread labor market hierarchies. Whereas significant resources have been invested in migration and integration policies, it remains unclear how they contribute to or mitigate labor market hierarchies between natives and immigrants. To answer this question, using the EU Labor Force Survey and measures of immigrant access to labor market and the quality of their employment, we adopt a two-step methodology. In the first step, for each country and year, we measure immigrant-native gaps in labor market outcomes that go beyond those explained by differences in observable characteristics of natives and immigrants. Such gaps, measured as the unexplained gaps using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, reflect a range of hierarchies due to unobserved factors, including selectivity of immigrants versus natives, differentiated returns on natives' and immigrants' human and social capital, or outright discrimination. In the second step, using a longitudinal model, we explore the variation of migration and integration policies across western European Union member states to study how they are associated with labor market hierarchies in terms of unemployment and employment quality gaps between immigrant and native populations identified in the first step. Our findings imply that designing less restrictive migration policies might help mitigate immigrant-native labor market hierarchies by reducing existing labor market disadvantages of immigrants and making the most of their potential.

Pitfalls of Pay Transparency: Evidence From the Lab and the Field

10:00
P303

Katharina Brütt, **Huaiping Yuan**

University of Amsterdam

Wage transparency regulation has been widely recognised as a promising tool to decrease the gender wage gap. Less attention has been paid to the determinants of how and when wage transparency can be effective. We combine field and laboratory evidence to address these questions. As a mechanism, we explore whether changes in beliefs about wages and performance may affect perceptions of just wages, which can reduce wage inequalities. In the field, this paper studies the introduction of a wage transparency policy in Germany in 2017. The law allows employees to request wage information of comparable employees. Exploiting variation across firm size and time, we provide first causal evidence that this type of wage transparency regulation does not affect the gender wage gap. In an online laboratory experiment, we study whether and how the failure of this wage transparency policy hinges on two aspects: (1) the endogenous vs. exogenous provision of wage information and (2) the absence of performance information. We confirm the field evidence and do not find a reduction in the gender wage gap, independent of how wage and performance information are provided. Instead, women enter negotiations less frequently than men if wage information is supplied exogenously. Information about others' wages or performance increase overall wages, but are not sufficient to narrow the gender wage gap, even though

performance information helps underconfident employees.

10:00
P303

Management Opposition, Strikes and Union Threat

Patrick Nüß

Kiel University

I estimate management opposition against unions in terms of hiring discrimination with a large scale field experiment in the German labor market. By sending 13000 fictitious job applications, revealing union membership in the CV and a pro-union sentiment via social media accounts, I provide robust evidence for hiring discrimination. The results show that callback rates for union members decrease significantly in the presence of high sectoral union density and large firm size. I further explore how this effect varies with regional and sectoral labor dispute intensity and find that management opposition is stronger when a sector is exposed to an intense labor dispute. There is evidence that hiring discrimination can be explained by sectoral union threat effects. Sectors with lower hiring discrimination have a lower coverage of collective agreements and in the absence of a collective agreement they are less likely to follow collective agreement wage setting. Furthermore, the collective agreement coverage is eroding mainly in sectors with little to no hiring discrimination.

10:00
P303

Appetites Grow With Age: Wage Expectations Among Slovak Men and Women

Lena Adamus, Eva Ballová Mikušková

Slovak Academy of Sciences

The present study investigated whether gender differences in wage expectations (reservation wage and expected wage level after probation) could be considered as a reliable explanation of the gender wage gap. First, whether women are willing to accept lower wage offers than men do was examined. Then socioeconomic and demographic factors that affect wage expectations in relation to a post of a regional manager in a winery were identified. A total of 381 Slovaks (201 female) participated in the study. Generally, women and men stated similar wage expectations despite significantly different actual incomes. Next, correlation analysis showed that reservation wage was positively related to personal income and masculinity controlling for age (the expected wage level after the probationary period was not related to any of the measured variables), whereas hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed personal income and masculinity as significant predictor of reservation wage. Finally, after dividing participants into age quartiles, ANOVA revealed that with increasing age wage expectations increased as well.

Malaria and Economic Development in the Short-Term: Plasmodium Falciparum vs Plasmodium Vivax

11:20
P303

Michaela Kecskésová, Štěpán Mikula

Masaryk University

Malaria - a disease caused by parasitic microorganisms of the Plasmodium genus|has been shown to impede economic growth and socioeconomic development in the long-term. In this paper we use annual regional data from India to show that malaria outbreaks are associated with an immediate decline in economic development approximated by night light intensity. We nd the association to be significant for outbreaks of both the globally most prevalent Plasmodium species: Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax. The estimated associations are quite sizeable. Severe outbreaks correlate with night light reductions of 5% of the standard deviation for P. falciparum and 4% for P. vivax.

Crime and Weather. Evidence From the Czech Republic.

11:20
P303

Vojtěch Mišák

Charles University

This article estimates the impact of weather on crime in the Czech Republic. Using detailed crime data during the years 2005-2015, I show that temperature has a significant positive effect on the total number of assaults, thefts, robberies and sexual crimes recorded. Furthermore, precipitation is found to have a negative significant effect on the number of assaults and sexual crimes committed.

Housing Wealth, Neighbourhoods and Life Satisfaction: A Metadata Instrumental-Variable Approach

11:20
P303

Zuzana Brokešová, **Andrej Cupák**, Anthony Lepinteur, Marian Rizov

National Bank of Slovakia

We analyse the relationship between housing wealth, neighbourhood's dwelling quality and life satisfaction. Using the Household Finance and Consumption Survey microdata from Slovakia in 2017, we first show that real assets (being the major component of household wealth) and life satisfaction are positively correlated. We address endogeneity concerns thanks to the metadata of the survey: we use the interviewers' ratings of the respondents' quality of dwellings to instrument the value of real assets. We show that the 2SLS estimate is positive and higher than the baseline OLS estimate, confirming that real assets are measured with error in survey data. Finally, we use the paradata to show that living next to a neighbour with better house quality significantly decreases one's happiness. Our results suggest that around half of the total effect of real assets on life satisfaction is relative.

Gender Differences in Earnings Expectations and Their Role for Major Choice

14:30
P303

Katharina Adler, Fabian Kosse, Markus Nagler, Johannes Rincke

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

How do students' earnings expectations differ by gender and how do they affect study program choice? We leverage unique survey and administrative data from a large public university in Germany to document a substantial gender gap in expected earnings, robust to controlling for a large set of student characteristics. Oaxaca–Blinder decompositions show that a fifth of the observed gender difference in earnings expectations can be attributed to differences in non–cognitive factors. We also provide evidence that students sort into study fields on their earnings and ability expectations. Expected earnings seem to matter only for male students and for students with high socioeconomic status.

Closing the Gender Stem Gap - A Large-Scale Randomized-Controlled Trial in Elementary Schools

14:30
P303

Kerstin Grosch, Simone Haeckl, Martin G. Kocher

Vienna University of Economics and Business

We examine individual-level determinants of interest in STEM and analyze if a digital web application for elementary-school children can increase children's STEM interest with a specific focus on narrowing the gender gap in STEM. Coupling a randomized-controlled trial with experimental lab and survey data, we can analyze the effect of the digital intervention and shed light on the mechanisms. We confirm the hypothesis that girls demonstrate a lower interest in STEM as compared to boys overall. Moreover, girls are less competitive and have less pronounced math confidence than boys at the baseline. The treatment increases girls' interest in STEM and decreases the gender gap via an increase in STEM confidence and inclination to compete. Our findings suggest that an easy-to-implement digital intervention has the potential to foster gender equality for young children and can contribute to a reduction of gender inequalities in the labor market such as occupational sorting and the gender wage gap later in life.

Peer Desirability and Academic Achievement

14:30
P303

Adrian Mehic

Lund University

On the marriage market, two of the most desired partner traits are socioeconomic status and physical beauty. Using the random assignment of university engineering students to peer groups during introductory freshmen weeks, this paper studies how a student's parental income and facial attractiveness affect

the grade outcomes of peers. The results show that exposure to highly desirable peers with respect to socioeconomic background and beauty improves grades. The results are particularly strong when the two traits are considered jointly. A field experiment shows that exposure to attractive faces improves optimism and well-being among students not currently in a romantic relationship.

Local Engagement: Do Community Needs Affect the Decision to Volunteer?

16:00
P303

Annalisa Tassi

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität

I study the relationship between changes in community needs and the supply of voluntary work. I present basic theoretical considerations, which suggest that voluntary work is positively related to an increase in local needs. Then, I test the hypotheses empirically by proxying local needs with the number of needy people, i.e., refugees, in a county, and by exploiting the quasi-experiment of refugees' allocation within Germany. I find that doubling the number of refugees increases the probability of volunteering by about 2 percentage points. My estimates imply that 1.7 million people additionally volunteered during the refugee crisis, i.e., that more than one person per refugee volunteered.

Once a Temporary Agency Worker - Negative Effects Forever?

16:00
P303

Anna Herget

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität

Does agency work cause a negative effect on the subsequent employment career? This paper investigates the effects of agency work in Germany on subsequent employment trajectories, i.e. the effects of agency work on subsequent earnings, risk of unemployment, and employment stability. I estimate the effect of temporary agency work on subsequent employment trajectories with a fixed-effects model with time-varying treatment effects. Preliminary results indicate a negative effect of temporary agency work on subsequent employment trajectories. I find lower earnings, a higher risk of unemployment and more unstable employment trajectories for individuals after an temporary agency work spell.

16:00
P303

The Unintentional Costs of Austerity

Dennis Gottschlich, Andreas Lichter

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf

This paper estimates the causal effect of social welfare spending on citizens' (mental) health. For identification, we exploit the large-scale cuts in social welfare spending in the United Kingdom during the early 2010s that affected different regions across the country to significantly varying extent. We link the resulting local variation in the intensity of these austerity reforms to practice-level diagnostics data and set up a difference-in-differences design to uncover causal effects. Our estimates show that those regions particularly affected by spending cuts experienced a notable increase in depression prevalence rates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the spending cuts caused unanticipated annual costs of up to £6 billion.

Participants

Venues and Travel Information

Faculty of Economics and Administration
Masaryk University

Address: Lipová 41a, Brno | **www:** econ.muni.cz

How to get there?

Public transport stop "Lipová"
- from train station "Hlavní nádraží"
  - tram no. 1 direction "Pisárky"
- from connection point "Mendlovo náměstí"
  - tram no. 1 direction "Pisárky"
  - trolley bus no. 25 direction "Bohunice, Univerzitní kampus"
  - trolley bus no. 26 direction "Nový Lískovec, Kamenný vrch"
  - trolley bus no. 37 direction "Kohoutovice, Jírovcova"
  - bus no. 52 direction "Zoologická zahrada"
- night buses (11 pm - 6 am) from "Hlavní nádraží"
  - bus no. N97 direction "Kohoutovice, Jírovcova"

From the stop "Lipová", take the first street to the right (uphill) and after about 200m you're there.

Faculty 3rd Floor Plan

The conference takes place on the 3rd floor of the faculty. Registration desk, coffee breaks, and lunch are located there as well.

The sessions are held in rooms P304, P303 and P302b. Once you enter the faculty follow arrows to the stairway and elevators.



Kabaret Špaček

Address: Kopečná 46, Brno | **www:** www.kabaretspacek.cz

Welcome dinner and keynote by Erik Plug are held there.

How to get there?

Public transport stop "Šilingrovo náměstí"

- from train station "Hlavní nádraží"
  tram no. 12 direction "Technologický park"

- from connection point "Mendlovo náměstí"
  tram no. 5 direction "Štefánikova čtvrť"
  tram no. 6 direction "Královo Pole, nádraží"

From the stop "Šilingrovo náměstí" walk downhill, second street to left and down the stairs.

- night buses (11 pm - 6 am) to "Hlavní nádraží"
  bus no. N89 direction "Knínički, U Luhu"
  bus no. N92 direction "Bystrc, Černého"
  bus no. N93 direction "Komín, sídliště"
  bus no. N95 direction "Chrlice, smyčka"
  bus no. N99 direction "Mariánské údolí"

Restaurant Mitrovski

Address: Veletržní 716/13, Brno | **www:** www.mitrovski.cz

Goodbye dinner after the conference day is held there.

How to get there?

- 15 minutes walk from the faculty or public transport to stop "Výstaviště - hlavní vstup", or "Mendlovo náměstí" from "Lipová"

tram no. 1	direction "Královo Pole, nádraží"
trolley bus no. 25	direction "Líšeň, Jírova"
trolley bus no. 26	direction "Líšeň, Jírova"
trolley bus no. 37	direction "Mendlovo náměstí"
bus no. 52	direction "Mendlovo náměstí"

- night buses (11 pm - 6 am) to "Hlavní nádraží"

bus no. N97	direction "Líšeň, hřbitov"
bus no. N98	direction "Jírova"

Masaryk University

The university was established on 28 January 1919. It was founded as the second Czech university, in large part thanks to the endeavor of Czechoslovak president Tomáš G. Masaryk, whose name it now bears. The funding of Masaryk University was one of the first achievements carried out by the newly independent Czechoslovak state. Masaryk University is comprised of nine faculties, two university institutes, and approximately 200 departments. It is one of the three largest employers in the South Moravian region. Teaching staff accounts for a full 2,000 of the overall total of over 5,000 employees. Over 180,000 graduates completed their studies at MU since the university's founding. Nearly 35,000 students are currently enrolled, including over 7,000 internationals.

www: www.muni.cz

Faculty of Economics and Administration

The Faculty of Economics and Administration was founded in 1990 as the first faculty of Masaryk University established after the Velvet Revolution. The teaching commenced in September 1991. Today, the faculty provides economic education to almost three thousand students not only in Czech but also in English and French. In addition to top-quality education, the faculty focuses on research: excellent scientists dealing with a wide range of expert topics operate in our institutes

www: www.econ.muni.cz

Masaryk University Experimental Economics Laboratory

Masaryk University Experimental Economics Laboratory (MUEEL) was established during autumn 2015 as a result of several years of research activities in an area of experimental economics. In November 2016 MUEEL transformed from a free group of academics of Faculty of Economics and Administration into an established research institute of the faculty. In October 2017 MUEEL opened two state-of-the-art laboratories that are one of the most modern facilities in Europe. MUEEL supports the organisation of YEM since 2016.

www: mueel.econ.muni.cz

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The program is updated with information received by May 11, 2022.

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

Online version abaiable at http://bit.ly/YEM_venues